Agents beyond Control? Organizational Design, Distributed Digital Systems and the Problem of Corruption

• In Event: 1249 - Theoretical and Empirical Advances in Rationality and Society

Abstract

Corruption can arise whenever agents can divert organizational authority toward individual interests. Conventional definitions of corruption have focused on the behavior of subordinates, however severe corruption problems also emerge from elite actors and within distributed networks. Organizational corruption emerges from asymmetries in monitoring, sanctioning, and decision making. Rational actor models of authority, social order and agency can help predict where organizational structures are making corruption more likely. Network problems of corruption arise due to both designed and emergent asymmetries in systems of interaction. Research in social networks, status, and reputation systems describe mechanisms that distort assessment and attention both within formal organizations and more informal networked settings. In this paper we use these theoretical frameworks to predict the corruption potential of organizations according to their organizational attributes. We apply this framework to a diverse range of organizations and assess them according to a range of corruption inducing attributes. In the discussion we consider the possibility that the types of corruption described in this paper might be increasing in scope and intensity. Research is needed to measure current distribution, organizational settings, and possible trends. We consider how the prevalence of corruption inducing systems limit the effectiveness of our organizations and leads to social problems. We conclude by arguing that social and computer scientists should collaborate in developing more effective organizational alternatives.

Authors

• Howard T. Welser, Ohio University

• Edgar Kiser, University of Washington