Rewarding Numbers: Quantification Premia in Organizational Evaluation

• In Event: 3564 - Measuring and Managing Organizations

Abstract

This paper contributes to research on commensuration – the act of making comparable
– by advancing a theory that, when uncertain about quality, evaluators both 1) discount
targets of evaluation that lack commensurable features and 2) converge on their evaluations
of those that do present such features. Specifically, I test whether the presence of quantified information in grant applications predicts success in receiving funding. I explore these ideas in a case study of the MacArthur Foundation’s 2016-2017 charitable grant competition for $100 million. First, organizations that include more quantifiers – simple digits or spelled-out numbers – in their application materials achieve higher average scores. Second, the presence of quantifiers reduces variance in estimating the score. These findings support the theory that evaluative uncertainty is driving the association between quantifiers and score. Even when quantified information is not directly comparable, it carries with it a veneer of objectivity that is attractive for thoughtful evaluators.

Author

• Katariina Wilhelmiina Mueller Gastell, Stanford University