Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

• In Event: 4255 - Section on Economic Sociology Roundtables (1 hour)
  In Refereed Roundtable 60min: 7. Law, Regulation, Policy

Abstract

Despite the significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that existing public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem this article proposes a four-cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this study introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. We also formulate a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with some implications for research and practice.

Author

• David Jancsics, San Diego State University