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Widespread opposition to immigration among educated and racially egalitarian voters is hard to explain using existing frameworks of self-interest or prejudice. I address this puzzle by developing a theory of parochial altruism, which argues that many people are willing to help others at a cost, but they want to help their fellow citizens first. Thus, most altruistic voters who are partial toward their compatriots are expected to oppose globally beneficial policies that forgo their national interest. As a result, voters tend to favor immigration restrictions that they perceive as necessary to secure the well-being of compatriots. To test my theory against alternative explanations, I conduct a population-based UK study with incentivized games and choice experiments. First, using a novel measure of elicited preferences, I find that most altruists who choose to donate to domestic as opposed to global charities are as anti-immigration as those who choose not to donate at all. Second, using a pre-registered conjoint experiment of policy choice, I demonstrate that, despite ethnic biases, most voters can support increasing immigration from non-European countries if they believe it benefits themselves and their compatriots. As indicated by similar findings from my studies in other countries, the dynamic of parochial altruism generalizes across contexts.