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Quasi-realism is an assertion about a degree: a matter of attention and how this structure of intelligibility alters what we take to be real. Given the partial separation of language from thought as the justification for an anti-foundationalist epistemology and calls to phrase the human sciences in cognitive scientific terms, the intelligibility of sociology’s own central subject matter is becoming a political matter that the mere assertion of theoretical pluralism alone cannot address. These politics become clear when one examines the sociological theorizing that delineates cognitive sociology from the contemporary debate in the sociology of culture & cognition, a lingering ambiguity regarding what “environment” means. In light of this debate, this paper seeks to articulate Durkheim’s arguments according to two different structures of intelligibility. In doing so, the paper revisits Durkheim’s articulation of the dualism of human nature, its relationship to Goffman’s cognitive sociology, and the prospect of a quasi-realism. The paper concludes with some notes regarding the difference between critical realism and quasi-realism.