Institutional ideals: privilege and injustice in the UN climate negotiations

• In Event: 2451 - Section on Organizations, Occupations, and Work Refereed Roundtables (1 hour)
  In Refereed Roundtable 60min: Table 11. Law and Work

Abstract

International negotiations on climate change have been repeatedly criticized for being unequal (Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan 2015; Dryzek and Stevenson 2014; Green and Chambers 2005; Gupta 2005), but scholars have thus far failed to explain this inequality beyond differences in countries’ geopolitical power. I argue that the roots of inequality in climate talks lie not only in geopolitical power differences, but in the institutional structures that shape the negotiations. Ultimately, the institution privileges those countries that are able to send an ideal delegation that can successfully navigate its structures. I identify the five characteristics of an ideal delegation: (1) large, with (2) experienced and unencumbered negotiators, (3) access to expertise, (4) English proficiency, and (5) contextual authority. The institution privileges these characteristics so countries that possess them are better able to assert their priorities in the climate negotiations. This mirrors the way in which other institutions, such as institutions of higher education, consist of seemingly neutral structures, yet construct an unequal playing field for participants. In analyzing how institutions produce and perpetuate inequalities, we can better understand how inequalities emerge and persist, as well as how institutions must be transformed to be made just. On an issue as urgent and consequential as climate change, it is critical that the institutions we use to address it do not further marginalize poor and vulnerable voices.

Author

• Danielle Falzon, Brown University