Why do we understand inequality in employment as a problem of representation?

• In Event: 1404 - Affirmative Action and Anti-Discrimination Policy

Abstract

Why do we understand inequality in employment as a problem of representation? Despite being rooted at the heart of American race relations, scant attention has been devoted to the socio-legal history of how Americans came to conceive employment inequality as such. Utilizing the first congressional debates on The Fair Employment Practices Commission Act (1945-1946), I show that what brought unequal employment to the forefront of public debate were the repudiations of scientific racism, which debunked the validity of “scientific” claims concerning race superiority used until then to justify the unequal social order. The focus on the unfair and unjustified treatment of minorities brought legislators and the public to view employment inequality as a problem resulting from irrational prejudice. Thus, it was seen as a problem residing in the sphere of mal emotions. As a problem residing in the sphere of mal emotions, inequality in employment became a rather obscure problem. Since legislators believed that they could not regulate emotions, constructing a Federal legal remedy under such a problem definition was unfeasible. The attempt to overcome this emotional problem gave rise to a new emphasis which sought to prove and eliminate discrimination (the action of prejudice). This new emphasis diverted attention from other forms of inequality, especially material inequality, reducing the problem to one of achieving proportionate representation as a means of proving fair play.

Author

• Tamar Hofnung, Hebrew University