A Bazaar Affair: Peer Selection and Collective Status Displays in the Market for Contemporary Art

• In Event: 4255 - Section on Economic Sociology Roundtables (1 hour)
  In Refereed Roundtable 60min: 10. Networks

Abstract

The economic sociology literature suggests that forming social ties to potential exchange partners is determined by “status signals;” that is, status-based competition motivates actors to form ties with actors of similar status, but avoid such attachments with lower-status actors. This paper, however, uncovers how and why higher-status actors might proactively form social ties with lower-status actors. Here social actors embed themselves with rivals and peers from across the status distribution to mobilize their combined market power. I draw on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork to examine the role of a prominent social venue, international art fairs (IAF), which facilitates such market coordination. I find that actors repeatedly participate in these organized events to hedge against increased competitive pressures from alternative market channels (i.e., auction houses and online bidding platforms) within their field of cultural production. The public display of mutual association among actors of varying status rankings during ritualized situated interactions helps market participants sustain the exchange for and social valuations of contemporary art. I propose that “curatorial” selection committees comprised of middle-status industry peers helps lower barriers to coordination. I discuss the implications for the literatures on embeddedness and status-based competition.

Author

• James Whitcomb Riley, MIT Sloan School of Management