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Despite the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, discrimination in employment based on such protected characteristics as race and sex persists to this day. While many discrimination cases are brought based on only one protected characteristic, many other cases are brought based upon more than one protected characteristic, such as discrimination based on race and sex, or “intersectional cases.” Judges have a tendency to not deal with intersectional cases in a manner which fully takes into account the disadvantage to which individuals are subjected based upon their race by itself, their sex by itself, and disadvantage resulting from the co-constitution of these two concepts that cannot be disentangled. This paper will review Crenshaw’s intersectionality as it applies to employment discrimination law and some refinements of intersectionality building upon criticisms of Crenshaw’s theory. Finally, this paper will review four landmark employment discrimination cases that deal with the intersection of multiple oppressions and discuss the extent to which the decisions in those cases reflect the reality of those existing at the intersection of multiple marginalized identities and redress the wrongs done to those individuals.