Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Session Type
Personal Schedule
Sign In
Deadlines
Policies
Program Updates
Accessible Presentation
FAQs
Search Tips
Annual Meeting App
The willingness to impose costly sanctions on others is a defining component of “cultures of honor”: individuals must signal that they are not an easy target for predatory behavior when an effective centralized state is not there to protect them. This article examines how the dynamics of sanctioning behavior change when individuals are contracted to sanction on behalf of others. An extensive empirical trace of an alleged honor system is drawn upon: a 52-year record of fights between players in the National Hockey League. While the violence in North American ice hockey is considered by many to be reflective of a larger code of honor that governs the game, the curious emergence of a core-periphery structure in networks constructed from fights between players suggests a transition to a private protection system. This reflects the emergence of “enforcers”: players who are known to participate in a disproportionate amount of fighting behavior. The final 5 years of fighting records are then segmented by in-game context: variation in the distribution and network signature of fighting by context shows that specialization promotes excessive violent advertising among those who are employed to maintain order.