A Normal Way to Break the Law: Social Network Theory of Bureaucratic Corruption

• In Event: 1531 - Sociological Approaches to Corruption

Abstract

In this article, we develop and test the first social network theory of bureaucratic corruption in the Global South. Widespread in non-democratic societies, under-the-table transactions between ordinary citizens and service providers represent a norm-compliant crime, which simultaneously breaks the law and satisfies dominant social expectations. Using social network theories of crime and case-studies of such corruption, we hypothesize that social networks encourage corruption by providing informational, risk-mitigation, and material resources but have no impact on this behavior through socialization and social control mechanisms. Using the first nationally representative survey from Russia (N= 2,350) that includes extensive modules on personal networks and informal economic behavior, we provide empirical support for our theory. Logistic regression on the level of individual and alters reveal that ordinary Russians are more likely to give bribes, presents, and do favors for bureaucrats when they can obtain corruption-relevant information and rely on protection from their networks if they get in trouble. At the same time, strong ties with non-criminogenic alters do not make Russians perceive corruption as riskier or less acceptable; by contrast to typical street and white-collar crime, such conventional relationships increase rather than decrease Russians’ likelihood of corrupt behavior.

Authors

• Marina Zaloznaya, The University of Iowa

• Freda B. Lynn, University of Iowa