Thwarting the Revolutionary Progress under Mao: Superstructural Mechanisms as a Primary Cause

• In Event: 2129 - Section on Comparative-Historical Sociology Refereed Roundtables (1 hour)
  In Refereed Roundtable 60min: 6. Populism and Revolution

Abstract

To what extent have super-structural factors thwarting the Chinese Communist revolution? This paper argues that the “failure” of the Chinese Communist Revolution is attributable more to superstructural elements ingrained in the ideological apparatus at the time and less to a policy failure. Neither was the general content of a Communist ideology presented the greatest problem, or a particular interpretation of it, but I argue that it was the institutionalized cognitive and linguistic practices—or “discursive institutions” in place—that were responsible to the extent of the alleged “failures.” I present the discursive institutions as a “first-order cause” that shapes several other factors: ideological content, policies, leadership, and administrative structures. I use the cases of (1) the accusatory discourses against Peng Zhen and (2) the discourse of Great Leap Forward aftermath to explain the causal primacy of discourse institutions.

Author

• Gordon C. Chang, Western Illinois University