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Growing public scrutiny of policing shows that it is often motivated by revenue considerations. Drawing on a mixed methods study of the Chicago metropolitan area, we show that existing accounts of revenue-motivated policing, which focus on offender targeting, “racial threat,” and concentrated disadvantage account for some high-fining suburbs but cannot explain rising fines in minority suburbs—especially high-income black suburbs. To explain the latter, we develop a theory that highlights the racialization of municipal opportunity: diminished opportunities to convert resident income into municipal revenue that are due to a) policies that promote inter-municipal competition for tax revenue b) in segregated regions characterized by concentrated economic disadvantage. Contrary to prevailing accounts, officials in black suburbs raised more property taxes per capita than comparable white suburbs. But they were unable to compete for commercial development, collected less in sales taxes, and lost more on economic incentives and debt financing. Officials turned reluctantly to revenues that burden residents, including punitive fines and fees, to fulfil ideals of “good governance” that they saw as commensurate with residents’ incomes.