A Model of Elite Fragmentation and Political Outcomes

• In Event: 50605 - Networks, Inequality, and Social Integration

Abstract

Nations, corporations, and social organizations are often structured as bipartite systems, in which the support of the non-elite masses determines the identity of the elites in power, and in-power elites decide policy. In such systems, accepted theory and lay intuition alike predict that non-elites extract more favorable policy concessions from elites when elites are fragmented. We introduce a model of policymaking in such systems. Contrary to expectations, we find that when the elites are fragmented, they enact more policies beneficial to themselves and opposed by non-elites. We identify a causal mechanism underlying this pattern that applies generally to such bipartite systems. These findings challenge the widely held view that a unified elite harms democracy while a fragmented elite benefits it, shifting our baseline expectations of power dynamics throughout society: Elite fragmentation causes more elite-friendly policies to be enacted. Policies favoring elites, instead of being a symptom of elite unity or collusion, can result from a structural process of fragmentation, representation, and policy reflection.

Authors

• Johan Chu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Mark Mizruchi, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor