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This paper proposes that the cognitive constraints identified in Dunbar's social brain hypothesis shape not only our social networks but also how we organize and maintain abstract knowledge. While evolutionary theories are often welcomed in social sciences, they are rarely fully embraced. Drawing on ethnographic evidence of how shared understanding emerges in social interaction, we argue that the same mechanisms that limit humans to maintaining around 150 stable social relationships may also constrain how we interact with abstract concepts. We suggest that conceptual understanding, like social relationships, requires regular maintenance through interaction and is organized in layers of familiarity. The development of expertise involves not just acquiring knowledge but maintaining active relationships with concepts through social engagement, similar to how social networks require ongoing interaction to remain strong. By examining cases ranging from mathematical collaboration to cross-cultural communication, we demonstrate that what we call "common sense" or shared understanding is not a static repository of meanings but an active achievement of social interaction. This perspective suggests that the boundaries of both social and conceptual networks are fundamentally local, emerging from specific contexts rather than existing as universal structures. The framework offers practical insights for understanding how knowledge is socially maintained and transmitted, while suggesting that both social and conceptual relationships face similar constraints and require similar kinds of maintenance through ongoing interaction.