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This paper investigates how positive and negative interdependencies between rebel groups influence civil conflict outcomes. Relative capabilities of combatants are pivotal in determining war outcomes (Gent 2011; Mason 2004). Yet, the literature has generally ignored the simultaneous presence of inter-rebel alliances and rivalries that fundamentally alter rebel capabilities. In this paper, we argue that while inter-rebel alliances enable rebels to reinforce their depleted capabilities, inter-rebel rivalries deplete these capabilities at a faster rate. Therefore, rebel groups that benefit from alliances and avoid engaging in rivalries are more likely to survive and thrive, whereas rebels facing rivals are more likely to accept accommodations from the government. Examining rebel interdependencies and conflict termination data between 1980 and 2008, we show that allied groups that are not threatened by rivals are less likely to terminate conflict by a peace agreement and attrition. Moreover, in the absence of alliances, rebel groups in rivalry are more likely to end their conflict by a peace agreement. Finally, allied groups facing rivals, unable to seize the benefits of alliances, are more likely to leave war through attrition. The paper offers important implications for scholars and practitioners who study multi-party civil wars and inter-rebel interactions.