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Since Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method, sociological holism has become an established epistemology, if not collective symbol, of the sociological discipline. Despite Durkheim’s classic formulation, sociological holism was adopted in various forms. While the French tradition of Comte and Durkheim linked holism to positivism, in the German-speaking context, the connection between holism and metaphysics was strong. In the German-speaking context holist modes of thought became popular within antimodernist movements after the First World War and a topical motive in critiques of the modern sciences (Harrington 1996).
In this paper we turn to the case of early 20th century Vienna, where various philosophies and epistemologies had become influential. Ernst Mach’s individualist sensationalism was a key inspiration for positivism in the shape of logical empiricism, but also appealed to more conservative thinkers such as Popper, Hayek and others. The Austrian School of Economics built on subjective value theory and was firmly individualist in its epistemological outlook. Holism, on the other hand, became particularly prominent and influential within radical conservatist thought and with the rise of its central proponent, Othmar Spann.
Following our previous analysis of holism and metaphysics in the thought of Spann (Scott and Rief 2021), we intend to explore in this paper whether there was also a holism of the Viennese ‘left’. Did the left-leaning social scientists and philosophers of science in the (Austro-)Marxist tradition explicitly adopt or reject holist stances, steer a middle ground between holism and individualism, or implicitly embrace holist schemes of thought? How did these stances interlink with and affect their late Enlightenment vision of social science serving a, broadly speaking, emancipatory agenda? Were empiricism and the critique of metaphysics set in critical distance from holist perspectives or also connected to holisms of certain kinds?