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This article explores how polycentric governance can enable resistance to democratic backsliding from within the state. The extent to which polycentricity can offer such resistance depends on the institutional capacity and bureaucratic autonomy of the state actors involved. Institutional capacity refers to an agency’s policy-making ability, while autonomy involves its power to resist political interference. We develop this argument through a critical event analysis of environmental politics in Brazil. Specifically, we examine environmental measures introduced by the Brazilian Supreme Court, Central Bank, and a consortium of Amazonian governors. The findings show that, while these entities were not directly tasked with social-ecological mandates, they promoted environmental-friendly policy-making. Consequently, this fragmented the power of an autocratic president. By discussing how bureaucratic autonomy and institutional capacity influenced the levels of resistance to democratic backsliding in Brazil, we unpack the limits and possibilities of polycentric governance in promoting democratic deliberation even within a context of rising authoritarianism.