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This paper explores the relationship between existing democratic deficiencies in legal systems and contemporary processes of democratic backsliding. Autocrats employ various legal tactics—ranging from introducing new legal frameworks, such as constitutional amendments or statutory reforms, to manipulating existing institutions—to weaken democratic structures. Focusing on a legal legacy of military rule in Turkey, the Specially Authorized Penal Courts, this study argues that autocrats may use authoritarian enclaves within legal systems not only to repress political opponents but also to obscure such repression through claims of democratization. In the early stages of Turkey’s democratic decline, the AKP government has utilized the exceptional procedures of these courts to suppress political opposition while simultaneously presenting its structural reforms into these courts as efforts to democratize the country and the proceedings at these courts as necessary evils for combating authoritarianism. An authoritarian enclave in Turkey's legal system thus provided the governing AKP with an opportunity to obscure its repressive actions under the guise of democratization. Overall, this paper highlights the dual function of legal "zones of authoritarianism"—both as tools of coercion and as instruments of legitimation—in contemporary processes of democratic erosion.