The Blame Game of “Whoops” : Nuclear Energy, Organizational Failure, and Blame Attributions

• In Event: 50462 - Section on Science, Knowledge, and Technology Roundtables
  In Refereed Roundtable (60 minute): Table 7: Organizations

Abstract

This paper explores the organizational failure of the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS). During the 1970s and 80s the organization planned to construct five nuclear power plants in Washington state. This resulted in cost overruns, delays, one nuclear plant, and at the time the United States’ largest municipal bond default. Using inhabited institutionalism and French pragmatist sociology, along with insights from the sociological literature on organizational failure and energy, I address the following question: How do actors within an organizational field construct and attribute blame for complex organizational failure? I answer the question by conducting a qualitative analysis of primary and historical documents. I find the organization and those most identified with it, tended to blame the broader organizational environment for the issues the organization was facing. Workers and outside actors, such as ratepayers and government officials, tended to attribute blame to the management of the organization. Other commentators tended to blame the organization and a large number of actors within the organizational field, often excluding the general public and ratepayers. Implications for the study of organizational failure and sociological study of energy production will be discussed.

Author

• Matthew Gougherty, Eastern Oregon University