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Does the social organization of belief influence our moral intuitions and judgments? Building on Durkheim's theory of collective representations and Martin's social aesthetics, we propose that certain moral principles and ideas originate in individuals’ practical experience of the social organization of collective sentiments and representations. In our argument, individuals develop attitudes toward moral pluralism in conversation with the opportunities the belief network affords to pursue moral unity and individuation. Using World Values Survey data, we examine how distinctive measures ofbelief constraint are correlated with support for moral pluralism. Our findings indicate that individuals with lower levels of positional constraint (indicating an individuated set of moral stances vis-à -vis the aggregate) exhibit greater support for moral pluralism. Meanwhile, the attitude of individuals with highly constrained personal belief networks toward moral pluralism depends upon the relative level of constraint in the aggregate network of beliefs. In general, our results support our hypotheses that attitudes on moral pluralism correspond to the experience of moral unity and individuation as properties of belief systems. Our framework highlights the potential importance of cultural network structures in shaping moral sentiments and offers a novel perspective on the interplay between individual and collective moral forces in society.