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FinTech credit is widely portrayed as a startup-driven response to regulatory inertia, with firms exploiting gaps in financial oversight. This study challenges this assumption through a comparative-historical analysis of U.S. and EU financial governance. Contrary to accounts portraying FinTech credit as a decentralized, bottom-up innovation, this study shows it to be a top-down, industry-led process—driven by American Big Tech firms. This perspective clarifies a longstanding puzzle: While policymakers in both the U.S. and EU employed similar rhetorical frames and policy justifications, their regulatory responses diverged sharply. U.S. policymakers facilitated FinTech credit’s expansion through targeted deregulation, whereas European policymakers closed regulatory gaps to constrain its growth. The U.S. case shows that FinTech credit’s rise was not due to regulatory inaction but to deliberate, selective deregulation—an active, if often quiet, state intervention that reshaped financial markets to accommodate American industry interests. The evolution of FinTech credit’s regulatory and technological landscape was shaped by industry-state coordination. By situating contemporary regulatory divergence within a longer history of political and institutional struggle rather than market inevitability, this study also advances debates on regulatory capture, post-2008 financialization, and the role of financial classification in reinforcing economic inequality.