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Success of the Fittest: Admissions Reform, Strategic Adaption, and Elite College Enrollment

Sun, August 9, 10:00 to 11:00am, TBA

Abstract

Research often portrays education as a stable field in which students compete under fixed rules, yet educational systems frequently undergo major reforms. Drawing on Bourdieu’s field theory, this study examines how policy change reshapes educational competition by analyzing a national reform, the introduction of an American application-based admissions into a traditionally exam-based selection. Using panel data from Taiwan, we compare two cohorts: one that encountered the reform unexpectedly and a younger cohort that had time to adjust to the new system. We find both reform timing and cohort exposure are significantly related to students’ educational attainment. Those who strategically utilized the newly implemented admissions track were significantly more likely to enroll in elite universities than their peers who did not. Furthermore, policy reform appears to have shifted the basis of educational competition from stratification primarily shaped by socioeconomic resources toward stratification increasingly driven by knowledge of and strategic adaptation to institutional rules. The study highlights how institutional fields and evolving rules of competition shape patterns of educational inequality in student outcomes.

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