Political Underpinnings of Debt Enforcement: The Curious Case of New York City Marshals

• In Event: Sociology of Law Section Roundtables Session
  In Refereed Roundtable (60 minute): Sociology of Law Section Roundtables: Table 6 — Punishment, Governance, and Social Control

Abstract

Sociologists understand the role of credit in reproducing harmful inequalities especially across racial lines (Dwyer 2018; Wherry and Chakrabarti 2022; Charron-Chénier and Seamster 2021; Seamster 2019). Implicit in this literature is a recognition that, somehow, a mortgage might turn into a foreclosure; a consumer credit line might turn into a tanked credit score or frozen bank account. But how does a delinquent debt turn into a seized asset? Who does the actual seizing? When? The answer requires an accounting of the enforcement mechanisms of debt. This paper looks at the case of one enforcement branch, the NYC Marshals, and their distinctive privatized, highly profitable, and deeply unpopular system to map out and assess some of the key dynamics of debt enforcement. For almost a century, mayors, civic groups, and judges have called for the system’s abolition, but no one has been able to rid the City of the marshals. I leverage the political contestations around New York City’s debt enforcement regimes as an opportunity to understand some of the underlying assumptions, opinions, and dynamics of debt: what do city officials or residents think creditors are owed? What do they think debtors deserve? Why has this system persisted? More foundationally, how does enforcement shape the credit landscape? Using historical methods, I trace the last century of the NYC Marshals and find two overarching dynamics at play. First, that a particular understanding of contracts shapes marshal practices and, by extension, shape creditor behavior. Second, fiscal crises dictate the realm of possibilities for reform as well as the underlying logics behind enforcement practices.

Author

• Sofia Butnaru, University of Chicago