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Session Submission Type: Paper Session (90 minute)
How do states govern markets while appearing to retreat from them? This session explores how market governance is enacted through indirect mechanisms, including infrastructural design, regulatory ambiguity, and organizational innovation. Across cases ranging from central banking and financial regulation to big data and venture capital, the papers reveal how state authority is reconfigured—rather than diminished—in contemporary capitalism.
Central Banks and the Infrastructural Power of Commercial Banks: Retail Fast Payment in Sweden and Israel - Daniel Maman; Keren Borenstein-Nativ, Political Science Department and The M.A. Program in Public Administration and Public Policy, The Max Stern Yezreel Valley College, Israel
Infrastructural Boundary Work, Federal Reserve Independence, and the Birth of Shadow Banking, 1948–1958 - Nathan Coombs, University of Edinburgh; Matthias Thiemann, Sciences Po
Governing through Category Ambiguity: The Making and Remaking of Regulatory Boundaries in China’s Internet Finance - Yilin Zhu, University of California-San Diego
Managing Big Data: The Emergence of Chief Data Officers in American Finance - Thomas Haseloff, University of California-Berkeley
The Deregulated VC Boom - Bo-Wei Hu, Princeton University; Olav Sorenson, University of California-Los Angeles