A Historical and Empirical Account of Collusive Construction Industry Practices in the Municipality of Laval, Quebec (1965-1989)

• In Event: White-Collar Crime at 75: Industries and Case Studies

Abstract

Collusion is a challenging offense to regulate. Not only are victimized parties rarely aware of or compensated for their losses, successful prosecution generally depends on voluntarily whistleblowing. Following a recent scandal on extensive bid-rigging practices in Quebec’s construction industry, this research tracks the historical and structural features of deviant practices identified across 5000 tender bids that were processed from 1965 to 1989 in the city of Laval. The study follows the organizing crime framework by demonstrating that, what is currently claimed to be a relatively recent phenomenon is in fact historically rooted. Using a mix of market and firm performance indicators and illustrations of the networks of bidders across time, the study allows us to flag potential collusive actions that extend to the 1970s. Working with such extensive historical data furthermore enables us to draw the evolution and the structures of collusive “cohorts”. In the views of those foreshadowing an era of regulation dominated by a global competitive economy, such work remains critical in the regulation process of industries where contracts are granted within a public procurement process.

Authors

• Maxime Reeves, Université de Montréal

• Carlo Morselli, Université de Montréal