The Effect of Surveillance Banner and Software on the Progression of System Trespassing Incidents: Preliminary Findings

• In Event: Exploring the Correlates of Cybercrime Victimization and Offending

Abstract

System trespassing (i.e. the act of gaining unauthorized access to computer systems) has been the focus of extensive technological research during the last two decades. Nevertheless, despite the criminal aspects of this behavior, only few criminological studies have been launched in effort to better understand this phenomenon. Addressing this empirical gap, we drew on recent extensions of the deterrence perspective (i.e. restrictive deterrence) and designed a randomized experiment aimed at assessing the influence of surveillance banner and surveillance software on system trespassers’ illegal online behaviors during real time trespassing events. More than 500 target computers (i.e. honeypots) built for the sole purpose of being attacked were deployed on the computer network of a large University in the United States for a period of six months. System trespassers who successfully infiltrated those computers were randomly assigned to either control or one of three treatment groups (surveillance banner computers, surveillance software computers, surveillance banner and software computers). To determine the effectiveness of such a surveillance banner and tool in deterring the progression of a trespassing event, we compare the rate of local reconnaissance, exploit and cleaning tracks commands across the control and treatment target computers. Preliminary findings are discussed.

Authors

• David Maimon, University of Maryland

• Theodore Wilson, University of Maryland

• Bertrand Sobesto, University of Maryland

• Michel Cukier, University of Maryland