Fighting the Symptoms, Not The Root Cause: An Examination of Israel’s Counterterrorism Strategies as Deterrents

• In Event: Terrorism, Corruption, and Drug Policy

Abstract

Conflict between Israel and stateless Palestine has existed since the establishment of an independent State of Israel in 1948. This conflict has often resulted in violent attacks from both sides and much of this violence has been classified as terrorism. Over time, the State of Israel has utilized a number of strategies and responses in an attempt to produce a deterrent effect. These strategies include operative measures (those initiated by Israel’s security forces, like the land incursion), defensive operations (efforts to develop obstacles or other barriers to disrupt terrorist attacks, like the security wall), and punitive responses (using legal measures, like the accelerated use of deportation in the late 60’s and early 70’s, to punish so-called terrorists and/or their supporters). In the current study, we examine the degree to which these and other government responses have produced the intended result of deterrence. Specifically, utilizing data from the Global Terrorism Database, we estimate Cox proportional hazard models to examine the effects of various Israeli strategies on subsequent attacks. The theoretical and political implications of these various strategies are discussed.

Authors

• Reem Abu-Lughod, California State University, Bakersfield

• Dale Willits, California State University, Bakersfield