A Game-Theoretic Evaluation of Suppression-Based Policing

• In Event: Game Theory, Gangs and Crime

Abstract

Prior research on the effect of police presence on the spread of crime has provided mixed results, but has generally supported a “diffusion of benefits” theory that geographically targeted enforcement techniques tend to disperse crime reduction benefits to neighboring areas. However, past work has also supported the competing theory of crime displacement, under which an enforcement increase in one area shifts crime to surrounding areas. In the current paper, we utilize a game-theoretic model as an evaluative tool for existing suppression-based programs. Police are modeled as a reactionary force that represents apprehension and punishment to actors. We anticipate that our findings will support the displacement of benefits theory.

Authors

• Jenny West-Fagan, University of California, Irvine

• Blake Allison, University of California, Irvine

• George Tita, University of California, Irvine

• Michael McBride, University of California, Irvine