Targeted Enforcement Against Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products: How Best to Suppress Violence?

• In Event: Police Strategies Targeting Illegal Markets

Abstract

Illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP) is growing in the U.S and may increase even more as tobacco control tightens legal markets.

The trade also appears to be becoming more violent. This paper applies lessons from other illicit and violent markets to analyze various targeted enforcement strategies against ITTP. Three main targeting approaches are contrasted: (1) suppression of market volume, (2) violence suppression based on the Pulling Levers strategy in illicit drug law enforcement and (3) a focus on only those ITTP networks and organizations with ties to terrorism. The costs and benefits of each enforcement strategy to suppress violence in illicit markets are discussed. The benefits of early enforcement timing to prevent market growth rather than reacting to it are also highlighted.

While much of the enforcement against ITTP is undertaken by local and state agencies, federal involvement will also be important, particularly to investigate and prosecute members of organizations with ties to terrorism. However, responsibility for enforcement against ITTP is currently spread across many federal agencies. We thus also conduct an organizational analysis to determine whether the current federal enforcement structure is adequate and whether ITTP regulation and enforcement should be consolidated.

Authors

• Mark A.R. Kleiman, Marron Institute of Urban Management, NYU

• Jonathan Kulick, Pepperdine University

• James E. Prieger, Pepperdine University