State-Corporate Crime in the Construction Industry: Examining the Symbiotic Nature of Corrupt and Collusive Practices

• In Event: Corruption and State-Corporate Crime

Abstract

As a result of state dependency (Gobert and Punch, 2006), large flows of money (Kenny, 2007), inelastic demand (Porter and Zona, 1992; Abrates-Metz and Bajari, 2009) and a highly-competitive environment (Goldstock, Marcus, Thacher II & Jacobs, 1989), the public construction market is often considered to be one of the most criminally-inclined industries on the international scene. Relying on the state-corporate crime approach, this study highlights the symbiotic relationship that may arise between political actors and business executives in criminal conspiracies organized around public construction auctions. As bid-rigging, bribery and illegal political financing developed as a way of life (Geis, 1967: 144) in specific markets, such irregularities and offenses might not follow trends of their own, but may become inexorably linked to one another, both in terms of structural opportunities and generated motivations. Based on a social network analysis (core-periphery analysis), the study tracks the emergence of state-corporate crime by illustrating the historical evolution of a large-scale conspiracy within a major Canadian city where corruption and collusive offenses have been firmly embedded for decades.

Authors

• Maxime Reeves-Latour, Université de Montréal

• Carlo Morselli, University de Montreal