Plea Bargaining: Penalizing the Risk-Averse

• In Event: Courtroom Policies and Practices

Abstract

Scholars estimate between 90% and 95% of cases are resolved through plea bargaining (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005); however, work by the Innocence Project and similar entities demonstrates that some plea agreements are made with people who are later exonerated, generating criticism of the plea bargaining process. The current study examines why someone who has not committed a crime would plead guilty. It was hypothesized that individuals who were more risk-averse would be more likely to take a plea, rather than “taking their chances” at trial. Participants were undergraduate students at a medium-sized public university in the Northeastern region of the United States. Participants completed an assessment of their penchant for risk-taking behavior and then responded to a series of scenarios in which plea bargains were offered under differing circumstances. Scenarios varied the seriousness of the offense, likelihood of conviction in the event of a trial, and whether or not the participant had committed the crime. Analyses examined whether those who were more risk-averse were more likely to accept a plea bargain in various circumstances. Results demonstrate that an individual’s penchant for risk-taking influences their likelihood of accepting a plea bargain. Implications for the courts are discussed.

Authors

• Laura Dykstra, Plymouth State University

• Danielle Marie Carkin, Plymouth State University