Testing Deterrence in the National Basketball Association

• In Event: Deterrence and Rational Choice

Abstract

Although the concept of deterrence has often been applied to punishment in America’s criminal justice system, there is little consensus on whether laws and policies can effectively deter crime. This lack of clear support for deterrence may be a result of missing elements from Cesare Beccaria’s deterrence theory; namely, that punishment is neither swift nor certain. Similar to the criminal justice system, professional sports leagues aim to control behavior of athletes by having guidelines that, when violated, result in punishment. However, these punishments are delivered much quicker and there is a higher level of certainty for punishment. This study will examine general and specific deterrence in the National Basketball Association by using longitudinal data of fines and suspensions since the 94-95 season to test whether punishment that is swift, certain, and severe can deter rule-breaking behavior.

Author

• Michael McCutcheon, East Tennessee State University