Congress as a Deviant Organization

• In Event: Reflections in Honor of the Life and Influence of Professor Richard Lundman

Abstract

In their seminal work on organizational deviance, Ermann and Lundman (1978) argue that “organizations...commit deviant acts” (p. 55), and define this deviance as “actions that interfere with the flow of benefits to actors...[with] legitimate claims upon an organization” (p. 59). They also note that other “controlling organizations” are tasked with regulating organizational deviance. Given the influence of campaign contributions on congressional policymaking (Peoples and Sutton 2015), which interferes with the flow of benefits to the public and directs these benefits to a small sliver of moneyed elites (Gilens and Page 2014), we argue that Congress should be considered a deviant organization—albeit a unique type in that it largely lacks independent, external regulatory controls. Congress gets to set the very rules by which it is governed and has significant power over how these rules are enforced, which creates a clear conflict of interest and allows its deviance to go unfettered. We contend that the same societal conduct norms that govern other contexts should be applied to Congress, and the “exempt status” enjoyed by Congress due to its ability to write its own rules and police itself should be stripped away to prevent it from being able to offend with impunity.

Authors

• Clayton D. Peoples, University of Nevada

• James E. Sutton, Hobart & William Smith Colleges