Naming and Shaming Corporate Crime in the Financial Markets

• In Event: Punitive Sanctions, Reputation and Crimes of the Elite

Abstract

Reputational sanctions have long been suggested as an efficient mechanism in tackling corporate crime. This article aims to contribute to an ongoing discussion in criminological theory on how reputational sanctions can contribute to controlling corporate behaviour, by focusing on the use of negative publicity and the corporate responses towards managing reputational damages in the UK financial markets. Through empirical data gathered from documentary analysis, in-depth interviews with regulators and market participants, and observations of administrative decision-making, the article studies how a powerful regulator uses publicity in a period of heightened reactions against corporate crime; how regulated firms react to it during the settlement of enforcement decisions; and how reputational concerns influence the regulatory dialogue. The findings show that the increased financial and reputational sanctions by the regulator in the post-crisis period have led to corporate responses of controlling the impact of negative publicity. The article argues that reputational sanctions may be more effective, and disclosure may result in better compliance if enforcers are sensitive to these processes of corporate reputational damage control.

Author

• Aleksandra Jordanoska, University of Manchester, UK