Recruitment in Mafias: the Organizational Dilemma

• In Event: Mafia and Organized Crime: Leadership, Recruitment, and Facilitators

Abstract

This paper analyzes (1) the complex process of recruitment, and (2) the organizational dilemma that mafias must manage. The paper is based on data collected from seven cases: Italian Cosa Nostra, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, American Cosa Nostra, Triads, Yakuza, and Russian mafia. As in many clandestine organizations, mafias recur to some strategies, such as: (1) Selected area of recruitment: Streets, family, prison. (2) Screening and information: Collecting signals of commitment and toughness; Long periods of observation of criminal behavior; etc. (3) Costly and severe initiation: Disincentives to entry as proof of real interest in joining the criminal group; Proofs and tests of criminal skills; Murder as entrance test. (4) Vouching: Sponsors of the recruit.
Mafia’s recruitment process poses a dilemma: On the one hand, collusive strategies, such as relying on blood relations, will ensure greater secrecy and lower willingness to cooperate with law and enforcement agencies, but are exposed to the risk that the new member will put parental interest before the organizational goals. On the other hand, recruiting on the basis of merit will ensure a better attainment of organizational goals, but at the same time may increase the risk of delation and threaten organizational security.

Author

• Maurizio Catino, University of Milan - Bicocca