Compensation Mechanisms Across Michigan: How Counterproductive Incentives Harm Both Attorneys and Clients

• In Event: Legal Services for the Indigent: Attorneys and Their Work

Abstract

Prior research has documented the pervasive inadequacy of the systems through which legal representation is provided to poor people. This inadequacy is driven, in part, by deficiencies in how attorneys are compensated for their services. Using Michigan as a case study, this paper describes the extensive variation in the compensation mechanisms utilized by courts in a state that employs a wide range of individualized, local solutions. The paper then assesses the impact of current compensation mechanisms on both attorneys and clients. Drawing on economic theories and visual depictions of the relationship between incentives and decision-making, the investigation reveals the theoretical and anecdotal effects of different compensation mechanisms on the quality of representation. Echoing earlier research, the analysis suggests that two common factors – perverse payment schemes and a lack of judicial independence – discourage attorneys from providing client-centric representation. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at encouraging thorough and effective work by attorneys, allowing local systems to maintain quality control, and – most importantly – ensuring constitutionally adequate representation to clients.

Authors

• Jonah Siegel, Michigan Indigent Defense Commission

• Chris Sadler, Michigan Indigent Defense Commission