Plea Discounts, Time Pressures and False-guilty Pleas in Youth and Adults Who Pleaded Guilty to Felonies New York City

• In Event: Plea Bargains and Extralegal Factors That Influence Them

Abstract

Most criminal cases in the U.S. end in guilty pleas and defendants who plead guilty receive comparatively shorter sentences than those who are convicted at trial (e.g., Ulmer and Bradley 2006). While small offers of leniency in exchange for guilty pleas are constitutionally permissible (Brady v. U.S., 1970), a common criticism leveled against plea bargaining is that plea discounts can be so large that they become coercive, even for innocent defendants (e.g., Dervan, 2012). Despite these concerns, there has been little systematic research on the actual choices faced by defendants who are offered plea deals. Through interviews of juveniles and adults convicted of felonies in New York City we found that substantial discounts are offered to defendants in exchange for guilty pleas and that defendants often have very short time periods for decisions. Rates of self-reported innocence and partial innocence (i.e., not guilty of offense charged) were high for both groups, ranging between 19% and 41%. Juveniles and adult differed on the frequency with which they saw their attorneys and on ratings of attorney trust and competence. We discuss results with respect to the differential impact that time pressure and plea discount size might have on youth.

Authors

• Tina M. Zottoli, Montclair State University

• Tarika Daftary-Kapur, Fairleigh Dickinson University