Moral Emotions, Counterfactual Emotions, and Deterrence

• In Event: New Directions in Moral Criminology

Abstract

Emotions play an important role in offender decision-making, and mediate the influence of cognitive judgments on criminal choices. More so than arrest’s perceived likelihood, it is the fear of arrest that deters offending. Other deterrent emotions, especially those associated with informal sanctions, both internal and external, also affect individuals’ responses to criminal opportunities. Most notably, the moral emotions of guilt and shame appear to strongly influence offending decisions. Warr (2016), however, argues that the emotion of regret is distinct from guilt and shame, and may be as powerful of a deterrent to crime as imprisonment. He further suggests that the moral emotions of guilt and shame have deterrent effects mostly because they affect anticipated and experienced regret. Regret, which is a counterfactual emotion, not a moral emotion, is the centerpiece of theoretical and empirical work in economics on decision-making, although it has largely escaped criminological attention. Our study uses experimental data from a survey of young adults to examine four research questions: 1) whether regret is distinct from the moral emotions of guilt and shame, 2) how it is associated with morality and personality traits, 3) if it is susceptible to policy manipulation, and 4) how it influences criminal choices.

Authors

• Justin Pickett, University at Albany, SUNY

• Jonathan Intravia, Ball State University

• Sean Patrick Roche, Texas State University