Court Actors’ Perceptions of Pressure to Collect Monetary Sanctions

• In Event: Interlocking Systems and Monetary Sanctions

Abstract

The Department of Justice’s 2015 investigation of the Ferguson Police Department revealed that political pressure from local government actors shaped the police department and municipal court’s efforts to generate revenue from fines and fees. Since then, researchers and policy makers have noted that there are many more “Fergusons” across the country, but little is known about how political pressure to impose and collect fines and fees for revenue is perceived by frontline workers in courts. In this paper, we use evidence from court actors’ accounts to understand the factors that facilitate (or hinder) political influence on court actors’ implementation of fines and fees for the purpose of generating revenue. Street-level bureaucracy theory posits that frontline workers, like court actors, are influenced by political, organizational, individual, and other contextual factors in interpreting and implementing public policy. As such, political influence can be muted, but tends to be more effective when political officials are proximate to frontline workers, especially at the local (e.g., municipal) level. Our analysis of interviews with 447 court actors across eight states shows that rurality, court volume, and client mix shape whether and how real or perceived pressure from political actors influence their decision making in imposing fines and fees to generate revenue. We discuss implications for reform efforts to minimize local reliance of fines and fees revenue.

Authors

• Sarah Shannon, University of Georgia

• Lacey Moore, University of Georgia

• Alexes Harris, University of Washington

• Gabriela Kirk, Syracuse University

• Beth Huebner, Arizona State University