Terrorism and the Trial Tax: The Effect of Plea Bargaining on Extremist Sentencing

• In Event: Applying Conventional Criminological Findings to Extremist Populations: A Series of Studies by Incarcerated Researchers

Abstract

Studies suggest that defendants who deny guilt, thus requiring a trial, are subject to a “trial tax” or a more punitive sentence than those who plead guilty to their offenses. Although this finding has persisted across a diverse array of samples, it has not been thoroughly assessed amongst those accused of politically motivated offenses. This study aims to address this gap in the literature by examining whether alleged extremists who plead not guilty are subject to a trial tax. Using data from the Terrorist Recidivism Study (TRS) and the Canadian Recidivism Study (CRS), the authors assess sentencing practices in Canada and the United States. Regression analysis indicates that a guilty plea tends to result in a lower sentence length than those who proceed with a trial, though not by the same margins as apolitical offenders. These results contribute to larger conversations regarding the ability of plea bargaining to offer due process within legal proceedings.

Authors

• David Cevallos, Idaho Department of Corrections

• Grace Meyer, University of Cincinnati

• Omi Hodwitz, University of Idaho