Sentencing in the Shadow of Promotion

• In Event: Racial, Economic, and Political Threat in Punishment

Abstract

A considerable literature in both political science and criminology has focused on the professional incentives of judges — how judicial decision-making might reflect a judge’s desire to be re-elected or promoted. I study these incentives in the context of federal district judges and nomination to the circuit courts of appeals. Given political incentives against appearing “soft on crime” and the scrutiny given to sentencing records in confirmation hearings, I hypothesize that a nominated district judge will be more likely to sentence a defendant to incarceration and for a longer period than a non-nominated district judge who is also a contender for that seat. This effect will be heightened in judges who are nominated with an oppositional Senate (i.e., no majority for the nominating president’s party). Using a dataset of sentences linked to federal judges, I analyze the sentencing patterns of district judges whom President Obama nominated to the circuit courts. Using fixed and mixed effect models, I find that, while district judges do not appear to impose more severe sentences upon nomination, those who are nominated with an oppositional Senate are likelier to be harsher sentencers in general. These results indicate that professional and political incentives might shape federal judges’ sentencing.

Author

• Nicholas Goldrosen, Pennsylvania State University