Optimal policies for fighting cartel violence in Mexico

• In Event: Drug Markets and Drug Policy: Methodological Advances and Theoretical Perspectives

Abstract

Cartels in Latin America pose a significant threat to societal stability and public safety, perpetuating extensive violence and causing socioeconomic disruption. Despite substantial investments in security measures by states like Mexico and the US, violence continues to escalate, with cartels showing a high degree of resilience to state interventions. This article examines the effectiveness of current strategies designed to curb the power of cartels, proposing a novel approach leveraging optimal control theory to analyze cartel dynamics. By modelling the allocation of resources between security initiatives and social programs, this study aims to identify optimal strategies for reducing cartel violence and mitigating the impact of organized crime on society. Through this analytical lens, the article offers insights into potential avenues for more effective policymaking and resource allocation in the ongoing fight against criminal organizations.

Authors

• Gian Maria Campedelli, Fondazione Bruno Kessler

• Jonathan Caulkins, Carnegie Mellon University

• Gustav Feichtinger, TU Wien

• Dieter Grass, TU Wien

• Rafael Prieto-Curiel, Complexity Science Hub

• Gernot Tragler, TU Wien

• Stefan Wrzaczek, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Vienna