Developmental Criminology, Self-Control & the Lens of Computation

• In Event: Advances and New Avenues in DLC Research: Methods, Theory, and Applications

Abstract

Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory unleashed decades of scholarship. What has become clear at this point is that self-control is robustly associated with antisocial outcomes, much in the way the original theorists expected. Sharply departing expectation, however, has been equally robust work revealing self-control to be a trait that varies for both heritable and environmental reasons, as well as one that exists among other key cognitive constructs known broadly as “executive functions.” Work in an array of fields has continually clarified the neurological underpinnings of self-control and where they reside in the brain. Yet more granular explanations of how neurological functioning creates self-control remain sparse. Here we describe new work being carried out in the nascent fields of computational psychology and psychiatry. By incorporating the insights of computational theory into more classic work in neurobiology and neuroscience, these fields seem poised to make much needed progress toward the goals of understanding the causal underpinnings of both psychological function and dysfunction. We argue that the time is right for developmental criminologists to avail themselves of the same insights and present a framework for what this empirical research agenda might look like, including data that can be accessed to begin the work.

Author

• Ana Caroline Stoffel, University of Mississippi