Guilty Plea or Coercion to Guilt? Experiences with Plea Bargain in Panama

• In Event: Prosecution in the Making II: Plea Bargaining and Case Processing in the Americas

Abstract

The transition to an accusatorial model of criminal prosecution has revolutionized, at least on paper, the way criminal cases are adjudicated in Latin America. Among the many changes involved in this transition, the plea bargain was introduced as an important trial-avoiding mechanism aimed to increase efficiency. Given how relatively new this mechanism is in the region, important questions remain unanswered. First, is the plea bargain being used? And, second, how is the plea bargain being experienced by defendants? In this paper, we answer these two questions looking at the case of Panama, where plea bargain was first used as a trial-avoiding mechanism in 2011 as the criminal justice system gradually began operating with a new criminal procedure code (Law 63 of 2008). We draw on interviews with criminal justice operators and on judicial data to describe the use of the plea bargain in Panamanian courts; and using original survey data from a sample of 1,578 inmates, we share findings on the experiences of defendants with plea bargains.

Authors

• Veronica Michel, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

• Sebastian Galleguillos, John Jay College of Criminal Justice / CUNY Graduate Center