A Qualitative Analysis of Legal Deference to Compliance in Corporate Crime Control

• In Event: Carrot or Stick: Regulatory Models, Sanctions, and Offender Responses to Sanctions

Abstract

This study critically examines corporate crime control to understand the relationship between compliance and corporate crime enforcement. With the transition from a punitive paradigm to a compliance-oriented model of corporate crime control, legal actors in the corporate criminal justice system defer to compliance structures when determining corporate criminality and penality. Analyzing corporate crime case dockets from four jurisdictions between 2011 and 2020, this study shows that the ways in which legal actors defer to compliance structures in corporate prosecution and punishment are typological and dependent on factors such as offense type, company size, and resolution. Additionally, the study also discloses how state actors reinforce the compliance model by incorporating compliance structures as a form of penalty. The findings support the idea of compliance symbolism and demonstrate how the compliance model institutionalizes “Too Big to Jail”. Relevant policy implications are discussed.

Author

• Li Huang, University of California, Irvine