Are Regulators Captured or Capturing? Organisational Interests and the Grenfell Tower Fire.

• In Event: Beyond Theory Testing: New Applications of Strain, Learning, and Control Mechanisms

Abstract

It is often assumed that when regulators facilitate corporate misconduct, they are “captured” by the industry and operating primarily for its benefit. Using the Grenfell Tower fire as a case study, the study asks why several regulators facilitated and enabled the deviant conduct of corporations eager to promote unsafe materials for use on buildings above 18 metres and whether capture occurred. Data collection consisted mainly of a thematic analysis of 150 days of hearings and regulators’ testimonies from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Through an individual and interactional approach to data collection, which focuses on individual regulators, I observed that regulators, as opposed to the industry or government, were the authors of their destiny, i.e. they have considerably more power than previously theorised when facilitating and enabling corporate misconduct. Several examples demonstrate that regulators were motivated by their organisational goals: capital accumulation, reputation improvement, and commercial interests. Instead of subservient to the industry’s will, they consistently wielded power for organisational interests through and within their activities. The findings are significant for understanding regulator’s motivations when they facilitate corporate crime.

Author

• Khadijah Naeem, Royal Holloway, University of London