The Paradox of Federal Oversight in Police Misconduct Investigations

• In Event: Responses to Police Misconduct: Promises and Pitfalls

Abstract

This Article examines the relationship between state prosecutors, federal prosecutors, and the Civil Rights Division inside the United States Department of Justice responsible for police misconduct investigations and prosecutions. Previous literature documents prosecutors’ concentration of power, yet they remain an understudied population in the criminal legal system, particularly as they adjudicate police criminality. To remedy this gap, I conducted over 50 interviews with police misconduct prosecutors, civilian investigators, and other legal professionals working in the domain of police misconduct investigations and prosecutions in multiple field sites. The interview data demonstrates that police misconduct prosecutors do possess idiosyncratic and specialized skill sets. However, I find that mounting public pressure for police accountability coincides with limited prosecutorial expertise and proficiency in successfully prosecuting police misconduct around the United States. I expose a novel paradox: experienced prosecutors may reject exogenous support because they understand it as disruptive and oppressive surveillance by outsiders. Results demonstrate that growing demands for police accountability confront established occupational scaffolds and federal collaboration threatens longstanding notions of occupational autonomy and prosecutorial esteem. The Article concludes with important theoretical and practical implications for the prospect of future accountability as well as structural recommendations for facilitating criminal legal accountability for police misconduct.

Author

• Ilana Friedman, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law