The Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 Tokyo Subway Sarin Gas Attack: A Police Intelligence Perspective

• In Event: Responding to Extremism and Terrorism

Abstract

As the 30th anniversary of the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway approaches, this study examines the lessons learned from the incident, particularly from the perspective of police intelligence. In particular, it investigates whether the failure to prevent the attack can be attributed to deficiencies in police intelligence or policy implementation by the top leadership. While existing research has primarily analyzed the radicalization of Aum Shinrikyo from a sociological perspective, few studies have examined the shortcomings of law enforcement. Existing studies of the police response have emphasized legal constraints rather than intelligence failures. Using content analysis, this study examines statements made by senior police officials and applies Mark Lowenthal's framework of intelligence process theory. Findings indicate that a lack of clear intelligence requirements communicated by senior police leadership to the police intelligence sector has resulted in inadequate intelligence reporting and hindered appropriate policy decisions. In other words, the failure to prevent the attack appears to have resided in the police policy sector rather than the intelligence sector. Although focused on a single aspect, this study has both academic and practical implications for future counterterrorism efforts.

Author

• Yoshiki Kobayashi, Meiji University