Changing the Default Sentencing Agent in Virginia: Pre- and Post-Reform Effects on Sentence Length

• In Event: Determinants of Sentencing Outcomes

Abstract

Intro: Nearly 98% of convictions come from plea deals (ABA, 2023). Despite the constitutional right to a trial by jury, trials are disappearing from our criminal justice system, likely due to associated penalties: slower trials, longer sentences, and higher fees. To counteract this “trial penalty,” Virginia enacted Senate Bill 5007 (SB5007), making judges the default sentencing agent in jury trials. Method: Using data from the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission and Virginia Online Case Information System, we examined: 1) SB5007’s influence on sentence length across trial types; 2) SB5007’s effect on racial disparities in jury trials; 3) whether sentencing agent explained racial disparities. Results: Jury trial sentence length increased post-reform, while bench trial sentence length remained stable. Pre-reform, Black defendants’ sentence lengths in jury trials were significantly shorter than White defendants’. Post-reform, Black defendants’ sentence length significantly increased, making sentence length similar between races. Black defendants convicted by jury trial but sentenced by a judge received longer sentences than Black defendants sentenced by a jury or who had a bench trial. White defendants’ sentence length did not vary by trial type/sentencing agent. Conclusion: Our findings contradict the notion that jurors are more punitive than judge and necessitate further sentencing disparity research.

Authors

• Anna Shen Knes, George Mason University

• Mindy Thai, George Mason University

• Hayley Jean Carlisle, George Mason University

• Vahid Jadidi, George Mason University

• Evan Marie Lowder, George Mason University